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merger will be effectively realised. Moreover, the paper offers a possible 
explanation for merger failures. 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Fusionen, Investitionsentscheidungen und unternehmensinterne 
Organisation 
Wir analysieren die Auswirkungen von Investitionsentscheidungen und internen 
Organisationsstrukturen  auf die Effizienz und Stabilität von horizontalen 
Firmenzusammenschlüssen. In unserer Untersuchung  sind Synergien endogen 
und es können interne Konflikte in dem fusionierten Unternehmen auftreten. Es 
zeigt sich, dass "stabile" Fusionen häufig nicht zu mehr Effizienz, sondern sogar 
zu Effizienzverlusten führen können. Da solche Firmenzusammenschlüsse zu 
einer geringeren Wohlfahrt führen, sollte der Regulierer nicht ungeprüft 
annehmen, dass potentielle Wohlfahrtsgewinne auch immer tatsächlich erreicht 
werden. Außerdem bietet das Papier eine mögliche Erklärung für das Scheitern 
von Fusionen. 
 
iv 
1 Introduction
Mergers are common practice in many markets and their dynamics, as well as their advantages
and disadvantages, are often discussed. Especially the analysis of horizontal mergers and their
possible eﬃciency gains have been important topics in recent years (European Commission
Report [6]).
Economic merger theory shows that a merger can reduce welfare by increasing market power
but that it can also create eﬃciency gains in a variety of ways, thereby making the merger
possibly welfare enhancing (see Röller et al. [24] for an overview).
This is the approach indicated by the Merger Guidelines released by the US department of
Justice, which “...will not challenge a merger if eﬃciencies are suﬃcient to reverse the merger’s
potential to harm consumers in the relevant market, e.g. by preventing price increases in that
market” (US Merger Guidelines, revised April 8, 1007, section 4). It is debatable whether the
European Merger Regulation No. 4064/89 allows or not for an eﬃciency defence. In practice
however, the European Commission (EC) has so far never used eﬃciency gains arguments to
clear a merger. But the EC is also thinking to include specific guidelines on eﬃciency gains
(Röller et al. [25]).
This paper broadens the theory on horizontal mergers with eﬃciency gains in concentrated
markets. Currently all discussions on mergers are limited to exogenous eﬃciencies while the
outcomes and policy recommendations could be diﬀerent when becoming more eﬃcient requires
investment and is thus a strategic decision. In their study for the European Commission, Röller
et al. [25] lament the lack of economic knowledge about the interaction of merger and investment
decisions: “It is not clear how one should treat the endogenous scale economies that are an
alienable aspect of concentrated industries”. The possibility that a merged firm may become
more eﬃcient does not mean that these gains will be actually realised as is now widely assumed
in the economics literature.
The aim is to shed more light on how merger and investment decisions interact, and look
how the internal organisation of firms has an influence on these interactions. A newly merged
firm brings together diﬀerent management teams, which can lead to distrust and conflict and
therefore possibly less investment.1 Our approach facilitates the understanding of why some
1A recent example can be found in the creation of Corus in 1999. The Anglo-Dutch group became the third-
biggest steel company in the world, but its value has dramatically come down. The Economist (March 15th 2003)
argues that the error was that Corus “failed to construct a workable model for its internal management, choosing
instead to paper over the diﬀerences between the English and the Dutch systems.”
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mergers may fail to become more eﬃcient or even fail to happen. This allows us to pin down
some pitfalls for the regulator when taking into account eﬃciency gains.
There exist two diﬀerent strands in the literature in modelling merger formation. In the
exogenous merger literature, the modeler exogenously fixes a group of firms whose members
compare the benefits of going together with the benefits of staying alone. Although these models
help to study the private and social incentives to merge, they do not predict the resulting
market structure. Other firms cannot react to the merger and more importantly, diﬀerent
groups of firms may find it profitable to merge. In the more recent endogenous merger literature
models, all firms are allowed to choose whether to merge or not and how to react to a merger,
providing a prediction of the final market structure. This proves to be crucial in making policy
recommendations and in understanding market outcomes and it is the approach we take in this
paper.2
Diﬀerent approaches have been proposed to model mergers endogenously. Some papers rely
on non-cooperative game theoretic solutions.3 But the theory of dynamic process of merger
formation relies on arbitrary assumptions concerning the rules and the timing of the game. The
alternative way we follow is to not fully describe the merger process, but to check whether a
particular market structure can be the outcome of a merger process because no firm wants to
change the current configuration. An industry structure is called stable if no manager or group
of managers has an incentive to deviate and form a diﬀerent firm.4 The backside of such a
methodology is its complexity and we only allow for three managers or firms present in the
market, this being the minimum number to allow for mergers with "insiders" and "outsiders".
We believe however that the main eﬀects present would not change in situations with more than
three firms.
2For example, Motta and Vasconcelos [20] show that a shortsighted regulator -one that considers only one
merger without anticipating future reactions of competitors- could make wrong decisions in considering only the
present merger. Or, Fridolfsson and Stennek [11] show that if being an "insider" is better than being an "outsider,"
firms may merge to preempt their partner merging with a rival, even if this reduces profits with respect to the
status quo.
3Take for example again Motta and Vasconcelos [20] who analyse a four-firm sequential merger formation
game. First two firms decide upon merging and then the two remaining firms can react by going together as well.
If both mergers go ahead, a monopoly market structure is considered. At each stage, a regulator can block the
merger and stop the merger process.
4Other papers that also used concepts of stability in a merger framework are Barros [3] in a three-firm Cournot
model for asymmetric firms and Horn and Persson [17] for any number of firms. Both papers however do not
describe internal organisation issues and abstract from the sharing of the profits between merger partners.
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We construct thus a model of endogenous mergers with three managers, or equivalently
with three management teams having aligned interests. We will use the terms "managers" and
"management teams" as synonyms throughout the rest of the paper. Managers choose whom to
form partnerships with while anticipating a share of the future revenues. In line with Rajan and
Zingales [22], we think it is realistic to claim that the manager and not the owner is in control
of many decisions that aﬀect a firm’s eﬃciency.5 Each manager controls some non-transferable
resources, such as organisational or managerial capacities, that determine production costs.
When managers are together, the resources of the new formed firm add up the resources that
the participating managers control.6 This allows us to take into account eﬃciency gains due to
the close integration of specific hard-to-trade assets owned by the merging managers, "synergies"
in the terminology of Farrell and Shapiro [8].
A merged firm cannot enjoy these synergies if it fires a manager (or his team) since the fired
manager would take his assets with him. This is most clear with human capital as the brought
in assets. If a merger is at least partly executed to lead to synergy gains by the bringing together
of hard-to-trade assets, it is not an option to dismiss a manager or his team.
However, the possibility that a merger leads to eﬃciency gains does not mean that these
gains will be actually realised. This is because of two related factors. Firstly, the right asset
investment for the firm may imply a private cost for a manager: it may leave the manager to
forego private benefits. In making the relation-specific investment which benefits the firm, he
may not be able to do a more market-oriented investment, increasing the value of his assets
for outside use and thus more benefiting him privately.7 The idea that managers’ interests are
not always perfectly aligned with the interests of the firm as a whole is not a new one and is
proposed by a number of authors in diﬀerent forms.8
5Rajan and Zingales [22] say that the amount of surplus that a manager gets from the control of residual rights
is often more contingent on him making the right specific investment than the surplus that comes from ownership.
Hence, access to the resources of the firm can be a better mechanism to describe power than ownership.
6This argument is valid for all cases where the resources are complementary. The same idea is found in Bloch
[4] and Goyal and Moraga-González [13], where eﬀorts in R&D induce a higher spillover if firms are in a joint
venture.
7This is again most evident with bringing in human capital. Take the manager (or a team of workers led
by a manager) who brings in specific computer knowledge. It would be in the best interest of the firm if the
manager learns and develops some information system A given the specific needs of the firm, but at the moment
information system B is more "hot" in the market. Thus, learning and developing system A comes at a private
cost for the manager.
8Fulghieri and Rodrick [10] model internal agency activities as entrenchment: to avoid personal costs, a
divisional manager can reduce the probability of his division being divested by reducing its attractiveness to
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Secondly, forging a common corporate goal out of two or more disparate cultures can be
diﬃcult and can even lead to less eﬃcient and less profitable firms. Surprisingly enough, concepts
such as distrust and conflict within the firm are often forgotten in the economics literature when
looking at merger decisions, despite evidence indicating that they play a major role (Seabright
[27]). It is said that the motivation of managers to work together in the interest of the firm
comes from team spirit and trust (Kandel and Lazear [18]). But, this is exactly what is lacking
in a newly merged firm. If people do not trust each other, then parties’ primary objective is
ensuring their personal interests, rather than sacrificing those interests entirely to the benefit
of the whole firm. This need establishes and reinforces the manager’s preference over the firm’s
(Flynn [9]). At the same time, we assume that it is not possible to write complete contracts on
investment decisions, since in many circumstances, it is intrinsically hard to describe the "right"
action in suﬃcient detail to distinguish it from many seemingly similar actions. Thus, the lack
of trust may lead to a free riding problem within a merged firm.
For simplicity, we only consider two extreme cases. We start by analysing the situation where
managers fully cooperate inside the firm. Managers trust each other and are willing to sacrifice
their personal interests for the benefit of the firm. This setup permits us to investigate what
happens when investment is a decision variable and compare it with the case where managers do
not cooperate within the firm. We find that if managers inside a firm cooperate, they have more
incentives to do so in a merged firm because of potential synergies. However, since they invest
only when it is profitable, a potential merger is not necessarily more eﬃcient, even when there is
no internal conflict. The second scenario considers a situation where the managers do not trust
each other. As a result, investment decisions are done only if it is beneficial for the manager
personally (or for his team). As argued before, these decisions are often not contractible while
a firm’s profit is easy verifiable and thus contractible. Thus suboptimal investment decisions
are likely to occur (Holmström [15]). We find that the conflict of interests within the firm can
dominate the possible synergies, making a larger merged firm invest less. A merger can therefore
even be a less eﬃcient firm than non-merged firms. One can think of a more rich and realistic
model where managers are not fully cooperating nor in full distrust, but somewhere in between
potential outside buyers. Hart and Holmstrom [14] present a model in which workers receive private benefits from
firm policies, which may or may not be aligned with owners’ benefits because a worker’s job satisfaction may diﬀer
from what owners want them to do. Mailath et al. [19] posit that the value of a manager’s human capital depends
on the firm’s business strategy. The resulting interaction between business strategy and managerial incentives
aﬀects then the organisation of business activities.
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these two extremes. The results of such a model should be close the model we present here,
but with an intermadiate degree of moral hazard. Equivalently, a world where managers do
not fully cooperate internally but investment decisions are partly contractible, would lead to a
model with an intermediate degree of moral hazard.
The equilibrium investment decisions have an impact on the stability of industry structures.
When looking at which mergers will eﬀectively materialise, we find for cooperating managers
inside the firm a result in the spirit of Salant et al. [26]: if all managers simultaneously can
choose to go to the monopoly industry structure, they will do so. Thus, when managers coop-
erate at the investment-decision level, the only stable structure is the monopoly. However, this
complete market concentration does not necessarily lead to a more eﬃcient production. For non-
cooperating managers, not only the monopoly structure but the duopoly and triopoly are also
possible stable outcomes. Two conclusions follow. First, conflict within the firm can lead to less
market concentration, even when mergers lead potentially to more eﬃcient firms. Second, when
there will indeed be mergers in equilibrium, these merged firms are sometimes to be found less
eﬃcient. This happens when -despite the internal conflict- it is optimal to merge, but -because
of more internal conflict and aggressive investment of competitors- managers invest less in the
larger merged firms.
Welfare analysis says us three things. First, taking eﬃciency gains as exogenous would
lead to the approval of many mergers that are welfare reducing. Second, this approving of
welfare reducing mergers is done more often and is more costly when managers do not cooperate
internally. And third, when using total welfare as a welfare measure instead of consumer welfare,
mistakes are also made more often. This calls for caution in allowing firms to defend a merger
on the base of eﬃciency gains. Especially in situations where information about costs and gains
of investing is diﬃcult to verify, it may be better to not let firms use this argument. It must
be mentioned that sometimes a merger is mistakenly prohibited when taking into account only
consumers, but this mistake is intuitively less costly than the opposite one. Allowing too many
mergers leads to more concentration, while allowing too few does not have this negative eﬀect.
We give as well an explanation for merger failures. When firms decide to go together, the
organisational diﬃculties that this creates are often underestimated. If managers do not correctly
foresee the internal problems, the new firm may not be profitable and thus resulting in a failure.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sections 3, 4 and 5 present
the solution of the diﬀerent stages of the model. Section 6 and section 7 discuss respectively
welfare issues and some extensions of the model. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
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2 Model
We consider a situation where three managers decide on their productive organisation. In a first
stage, managers choose whether to set up their own firm or join forces with other managers,
determining the industry structure (Ω). Three market structures can arise: monopoly, duopoly
or triopoly. These industry structures are denoted, respectively, ΩM = {m}, ΩD = {i, o} and
ΩT = {t1, t2, t3}, where m stands for a monopoly firm, i for a two-manager firm in the duopoly
(set up by the two "insiders"), o for a single-manager firm in the duopoly (managed by the
"outsider") and t for triopolist. In the second stage, production costs are determined. Each
manager decides to which extent he makes a costly investment to reduce production costs. In
the third stage the formed firms compete à la Cournot.
In the first stage, the merger stage, each manager decides whether to form a firm alone or
together with other managers. We explain which firms merge and how merging partners share
profits. We posit that the industry structure that will prevail should be stable, that is, no
manager or set of managers can win by deviating form this structure. In evaluating a possible
deviation, managers must make a prediction of what the other managers will do. Several ad-hoc
assumptions have been followed by the literature.9 We adopt the -novel to our notice- view that
the most reasonable prediction when deciding upon a deviation is that the remaining managers
will choose their best strategy.
Definition 1 An industry structure Ω is stable if there is no profitable deviation by a group of
managers to form another firm, considering that the remaining managers would choose to form
firms to maximise their payoﬀ.
When all three managers look to deviate from the current market structure and form a
monopoly, we only need to check whether this is profitable since there are no managers left.
When two managers deviate to form a two-manager firm, the remaining manager can only stay
alone. More interestingly, when only one manager deviates, the remaining two optimally choose
either to go together or to split apart.
9Mainly two assumptions are made in the literature. A first approach is to assume that all managers not
involved in the deviation will split apart towards stand-alone firms (e.g. Barros [3]). The second way is to assume
that the other managers do not react at all, which is how Horn and Persson [17] model stability.
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For simplicity, we present throughout the paper the case where the sharing of a firm’s profits
is exogenously set to giving all managers an equal part. But as argued in detail in Section 8,
our results remain qualitatively unchanged when optimal contracts are used within a firm.
Once firms are formed and the market structure is set, production costs are determined in a
second stage. Following Perry and Porter [21], we allow the possibility that the merged firm is
larger than any of the forming firms, i.e. that it produces at lower marginal cost. We model this
by assuming that each manager has a limited amount of resources or assets which, if adequately
employed, lower the production cost of the firm. Hence, more managers in the firm increases
the possibilities to lower the marginal cost of production. These assets also have an alternative
use outside the firm and making the right asset investment for the firm implies a private cost
for the manager. Thus in contrast to Perry and Porter [21], insiders do not always devote their
resources to reduce the marginal costs of the merged firm. Consequently, if insiders do not invest
in cost reducing activities, merged firms might not be more eﬃcient than either of the merging
firms. This allows us to diﬀerentiate between potential and realised eﬃciency gains.
To accommodate this additional decision, we assume that the magnitude of the investment
by the managers are substracted from the common marginal cost, S (instead of divided as in
Perry and Porter’s model). Accordingly, the constant marginal cost of firm ω in a given market
structure is given by
sω = S −
X
j∈ω
Ij , (1)
where Ij , Ij ∈ {0, k}, represents the magnitude that investment by manager j brings in lowering
the production costs of firm ω.10 The cost of an investment Ij is Cj (Ij), where Cj (0) = 0 and
Cj (k) = c. As explained above, c represents the private benefits lost by making the relation-
specific investment Ij , which lowers the marginal costs by k units.11 If managers’ assets do not
have any outside value, c = 0, then all the managers in all possible market structures devote
resources to reduce the marginal cost and our model leads to the same qualitative results as in
Perry and Porter’s model [21].
Managers simultaneously choose whether to make this relation-specific investment. As a
10We assume that in equilibrium all firms in all industry structures produce a non-negative quantity and
therefore k ∈ [0, (a− S) /2].
11Note that an alternative approach is to assume that the investment belongs to an interval [0, k] . Given
the linearity of the model, this would be equivalent to the assumption I ∈ {0, k} since the optimal decision
on investment is always a corner solution. To consider convex cost functions for investment makes the model
untractable when managers decide upon investment levels.
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benchmark case, in a first scenario the managers in each firm cooperatively decide which invest-
ments to make. Indeed, if there is no internal conflict within a firm, managers behave in the
interest of the firm to which they belong. In the second case, each manager does what is best
for him individually because of a lack of trust.
In the third stage of the game, firms simultaneously decide their production level. We
consider a homogeneous market with a linear demand, P (Q) = a − Q, where a is a positive
constant measuring the size of the market and Q =
P
ω∈Ω
qω is the total production, with qω the
production of firm w.12
We solve the game by backward induction. For each scenario and for each market structure,
managers take investment decisions, anticipating production decisions. Multiple Nash equilibria
in investment may exist in a particular market structure. If this happens, at the merger stage
managers need to make a prediction about which would be the investment outcome at that
market structure. As other authors, we adopt the view that managers are optimistic: when
considering a deviation leading to that structure, a manager or a group of managers predict
that the resulting investment equilibrium will be the one which benefits him or them the most.
Although this view may induce many deviations and no stable industry structure, it allows us
to concentrate on the ‘very’ stable ones.13
3 Product market competition (3rd Stage)
Assume that an industry structure Ω with r firms has been formed at stage 1 and the investments
made in stage 2 imply costs sυ, for all v ∈ Ω. Then each firm w ∈ Ω maximizes its profits:
max
qω
("
a−
X
υ∈Ω
qυ
#
qω − sωqω
)
.
12 It is in the interest of all the managers in the same firm to cooperate in the product market. This is because
we do not assume that there is an individual cost attached to producing. For a partnership formation model
where production is costly for each manager, see Espinosa and Macho-Stadler [7].
13Diamantoudi [5] analyses the endogenous formation of coalitions using the concept of ‘binding agreements’
when there are multiple Nash equilibria and considers diﬀerent behavioral assumptions, among others the opti-
mistic approach. Our assumption of managers being optimistic reduces the set of stable market structures, making
in some cases the set empty. In our model with three managers, stability is reached for almost all parameter com-
binations. Non-existence of stable outcomes is something wich unfortunately happens often when using stability
concepts as for example in Horn and Persson [17]. If managers were pessimistic and hence less willing to deviate,
while the set of empty structures may be smaller, we might have situations with multiple stable structures.
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The Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game leads firm ω ∈ Ω to produce
qω =
a+
P
υ∈Ω,υ 6=ω
sυ − rsω
r + 1 =
a− S −
P
υ∈Ω,υ 6=ω
Iυ + rIω
r + 1 . (2)
Without loss of generality we normalize a− S = 1. The equilibrium (gross) profit for firm ω is
Πω =
Ã
1−
P
υ∈Ω,υ 6=ω
Iυ + rIω
!2
(r + 1)2
. (3)
4 Endogenous Investment (2nd stage)
A manager brings in hard-to-trade assets to the firm which if adequately employed lead to lower
marginal costs. When managers merge, the resulting firm might become more eﬃcient. We say
that there are eﬃciency gains when a merged firm produces at a lower marginal cost than would
separate entities do. This lowering in marginal costs is not due to simple scale economies, but to
the close integration of specific hard-to-trade assets owned by the merging managers, possibilities
of "synergies" in the terminology of Farrell and Shapiro [8]. But the bringing together of these
assets alone is not enough to realise synergies. It must be that managers use these assets in a
productive way.
Definition 2 A merger implies eﬃciency gains when the merged firm produces at a lower
marginal cost than would separate entities do.
We look at two extreme cases of internal organisation. First, we discuss the scenario where
managers cooperate fully within the firm. This results in the best possible situation for the
managers (first best). Second, the situation where profits are verifiable but investment is un-
contractible, the "internal conflict" case, is looked at. This assumption is motivated by the
observation that, in many circumstances, it is intrinsically hard to describe the "right" action
in suﬃcient detail to distinguish it from many seemingly similar actions with quite diﬀerent
payoﬀ consequences. Contracting to induce that action may be impossible even after the state
of the world is realised. On the other hand, the monetary benefits of the firm are contractible
because they are easily verifiable. Of course, other organisational set-ups are possible (see e.g.
in Gal-Or [12] where diﬀerent forms of integration are compared), but less adequate to describe
an organisational integration where synergies can arise.
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4.1 No Internal Conflict
If investment is a cooperative decision within the firm, the profit for a manager j in firm ω ∈ Ω
with |ω| managers is
πjω =
1
|ω|Πω −
1
|ω|
X
l∈ω
Cl . (4)
Note that maximizing (4) is equivalent to maximizing the (net) profits of the firm. Investment
of diﬀerent firms must form a Nash equilibrium.
It is intuitive enough that costs c and gains k of investment play a major role in what
happens in equilibrium and our analysis is done in function of these two parameters. But
apart from costs and gains, the amount in which firms will decide to reduce production costs
depends (i) on the size of the firms, i.e. the number of managers in the firm, and (ii), on the
competition level. First, the larger a firm is, the more incentives to invest. Since managers in
the same firm are cooperating, they will be able to exploit the synergies. Second, a firm may
want to invest for strategic reasons. Investment activities are strategic substitutes across firms
and more investment implies later on a better position in the production phase vis à vis the
competitors. Therefore, the more competitors in the market, the more incentives a manager
has to invest. This means that the scale eﬀect and strategic eﬀect go in opposite directions.14
Proposition 1 states the previous intuition as a function of the parameters of the model. Remark
that we state the eﬃciency gains in the conditional state. At this stage we do not know yet which
mergers are going to take place, if any.
Proposition 1 When managers cooperate, for costs w.r.t. gains of investment going from low
to high, we can distinguish four regions:
(A) All managers invest. Any merger would imply eﬃciency gains.
(B) Managers in the monopoly and insiders in a duopoly invest, but single-manager firms may
not. Any merger would imply eﬃciency gains.
(C) Managers that set up a firm alone do not invest. Either the monopolists or the insiders
invest. There exist therefore always a merger that would lead to eﬃciency gains, but not any
merger would lead to an eﬃciency gain.
14This is of course an immediate consequence of our model. The number of managers in the market is fixed,
so if there are more managers inside the firm -i.e. the firm is larger- there are less managers outside the firm -ie.
there are less competitors. However, it seems natural to assume that, given a certain industry, larger firms and a
more concentrated market go together, even if there would be free entry.
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(D) Nobody invests. No merger would imply eﬃciency gains.
The regions defined in Proposition 1 are stated formally in the Appendix and are depicted in
Figure 1.15 When the investment is free (i.e., c = 0) or its costs are very low, any firm will invest
in reducing production costs (region A). On the contrary, when the investment is extremely
expensive as compared to the cost-production savings, the optimal decision will be not to invest
(region D). For intermediate ranges of costs w.r.t. gains of investment, the synergy and strategic
issues determine who invests. Region B shows that the first managers to give up investing are
the one-manager firms, because the synergy event is strongest: the smallest firms loose first
their incentives. In region C, both eﬀects can dominate. In region C1, only monopolists invest
because the synergy eﬀect dominates. In region C2, the strategic motive is more important and
the insiders in the duopoly invest whereas the monopolists do not. Note that within the duopoly
the insiders have more incentives to invest than the outsider because of the scale eﬀect. In our
model the strategic eﬀects are almost always inferior to the scale eﬀects when there is no internal
conflict.
[Place Figure 1 approximately here]
Multiple investment equilibria may exist. The optimal decision for a monopoly and duopoly
is always unique. In the triopoly the type of equilibrium is unique but it is not always clear
which manager invests in equilibrium. There are three equilibria of the type ((k)(k)(0)) where
two managers invest, I = k, and the third does not. In another region of the parameters there
exist three Nash equilibria where the investment decisions take the form ((k)(0)(0)). This is
because managers are ex-ante symmetric and we cannot say who invests and who not. This is
not important in the investment stage, but the identity of the managers that invest or does not
may be important at the merger stage.
4.2 Internal Conflict
We now solve the situation where managers within the firm do not cooperate when taking
investment decisions. Managers choose again their investment as a function of the gains this
investment implies for the profits of the firm to which they belong. But the cost of investing is
not shared by the whole firm, the managers individually bear this cost and a free riding problem
15Note that the normalisation a − S = 1 implies that k ∈ [0, 1/2] in order to have all firms producing in
equilibrium. Without the normalisation, the axes in Figure 1 would have been: k/(a − S) and c/(a − S).
Comparative statics with respect to (a− S) would simply expand or contract the Figure.
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might arise. The profit for a manager j in firm ω ∈ Ω with |ω| managers is
πjω =
1
|ω|Πω −Cj . (5)
As in the first best case, the amount in which firms decide to reduce production costs depends
(i) on the size of the firms and (ii), on the competition structure. However, the issues are not as
clear cut anymore. If a firm is larger, there are still more chances to exploit the synergies. But
also the possibility for internal conflict grows. In a larger firm each manager receives a smaller
share of the gross profits induced by his individually costly investment. The eﬀect of the size
of a firm on the incentives to invest can go both ways. Whereas for low costs with respect to
gains of investment synergies dominates, conflict becomes rapidly more important as costs w.r.t.
gains rise. Thus, managers in larger firms loose much faster their incentives to invest than in the
case without conflict. The strategic event still induces managers in a less concentrated market to
invest more. It is therefore easy to understand that both the conflict and strategic eﬀect go in
the same direction. When conflict is strong, managers in smaller firms -and therefore also facing
more competitors- have more incentives to invest. Proposition 2 states the previous intuition as
a function of the parameters of the model.
Proposition 2 When managers do not cooperate inside the firm, for costs w.r.t. gains of in-
vestment going from low to high, we can distinguish four regions:
(E) Managers in a monopoly and insiders invest. Any merger would imply eﬃciency gains.
(F) Managers in a monopoly never invest and there is always an equilibrium in which insiders
invest. In the equilibrium where insiders invest, a merger towards duopoly would imply eﬃciency
gains. A merger towards monopoly would mean an eﬃciency loss.
(G) Managers in the monopoly and insiders never invest, but there exists always a single-
manager firm that does. Any merger would imply eﬃciency losses.
(H) Nobody invests. No merger leads to eﬃciency gains or eﬃciency losses.
The regions defined in Proposition 2 are stated formally in the Appendix and are depicted in
Figure 2. In region E where the investment is close to free, any firm invests. Within this region
conflict is not important, and the synergy eﬀect dominates, implying that the largest firms in the
market have most incentives to invest. When costs rise relatively, the conflict issue, reinforced
by the strategic eﬀect, starts interfering with scale and managers in the monopoly stop investing
(region F1). Further on, the conflict situation becomes more and more important, making either
the insiders or the outsider in duopoly invest (region F2). The conflict eﬀect becomes finally
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always dominant and insiders never invest anymore (region G). Finally, when the investment
is extremely expensive as compared to the cost-production savings, the optimal decision for all
managers will be not to invest (region H).
[Place Figure 2 approximately here]
What does this imply for the eﬃciency gains? As long as the monopolist invests, any merger
leads to a more eﬃcient firm. From the moment that managers in the monopoly do not invest
and other managers still do, a merger towards monopoly leads to eﬃciency losses. When also
the insiders stop investing and the one-manager firm still does, any merger leads to eﬃciency
losses. Finally, when nobody invests, a merger does not lead to any eﬃciency changes.
Summarising the results obtained for both scenarios, some mergers may induce eﬃciency
gains but for this to be true a necessary condition is that the cost of the investment compared
to the gains are low enough. When the internal conflict is important, a merger may even imply
eﬃciency losses.
5 Stable market structures (1st stage)
Managers decide in the first stage to stay alone or go together with other managers, antici-
pating the investment decisions and competition in the market. We analyse the stable industry
structures. We consider first the situation with no internal conflict.
5.1 No Internal Conflict
When managers cooperate within the firms, larger firms tend to invest more and tend to be
more profitable. This makes it naturally more interesting for managers to merge. The next
proposition confirms this intuition.
Proposition 3 When there is no internal conflict within firms, the monopoly is the only stable
structure.
Two diﬀerent processes lead the monopoly to be the only stable outcome. The first takes
place because managers are able to avoid the classical outsider-problem. If a managers tries to
free-ride on the others by deviating, the other two optimally split apart, making the deviation
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unprofitable.16 The other process leads managers very naturally towards the monopoly outcome,
because any merger is profitable for all managers.
When the cost of investment is high with respect to its gains (region D in the corresponding
Figure 1), managers do not invest and the only motive for merging is having more market
power. Managers reach thus the monopoly through the first process. However, when the cost of
investment is low with respect to its gains (region A), managers always prefer to invest because
of synergies. Merged entities have therefore lower production costs, leading in general to more
incentives to merge than when nobody invests. This situation is similar to the situation described
in Perry and Porter [21], where the merged firm has lower production costs than either of the
forming firms. Note, however, that for intermediate gains, managers still prefer to be an outsider
over being in a monopoly, but now the other two will prefer to stay together over being alone.
There will be therefore continuously a duopoly, but the formed firms are not stable. This area
is depicted in Figure 3. Finally, in regions B and C, either the first or the second process makes
the monopoly the only stable outcome.
[Place Figure 3 approximately here]
5.2 Internal Conflict
We present the stable mergers when conflict within firms happens. For the sake of presentation,
we show the results separately for the four regions identified in Proposition 2. Consider first the
case corresponding to Proposition 2(E) where the cost of investment is low with respect to its
gains, making monopolists and insiders always invest.
Proposition 4 When there is internal conflict within firms and investment costs w.r.t. gains
are low (monopolists and insiders always invest), the monopoly is the only stable structure.
When managers always prefer to invest, entities merge towards monopoly for exactly the
same reasons as when managers always invest in the no-conflict situation. These results are
depicted in the lower part of Figure 4 (equivalent to region E of Figure 2).
[Place Figure 4 approximately here]
16The outsider-problem occurs when it is beneficial for all to merge towards monopoly, but it is even better to
be the outsider in duopoly. This is the situation in Salant et al. [26]. In their model, where there are no synergies,
merging is beneficial if the number of outsiders is low and the merging firms represent at least 80% of the total
market. In our three-firm case this threshold implies the merger towards monopoly.
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The case corresponding to Proposition 2(F ) is where the conflict eﬀect starts interfering with
the synergy eﬀect, making the monopoly never investing and there is always an equilibrium in
which insiders invest.
Proposition 5 When there is internal conflict within firms and costs w.r.t. gains of investment
are intermediate (monopolists never invest and insiders might invest),
(a) If in equilibrium the insiders always invest, the duopoly or monopoly can be the unique stable
industry structure.
(b) If in equilibrium either insiders or the outsider invest, the duopoly is the only stable structure.
Whenever the gains are high, the duopoly in which the insiders invest is the stable industry
structure. The conflict eﬀect induces the monopoly not to invest, but it is still not dominating
in the two-player firm, making the insiders in the duopoly the best oﬀ (see intermediate part
of Figure 4, corresponding to region F1 and F2 of Figure 2). In addition, insiders do not have
incentives to split apart: the gains are high enough to prevent them to deviate to triopoly. Hence,
duopoly is the stable market structure.17 Insiders obtain here a higher profit than monopolists.
This is an important eﬀect that appears with conflict. When there is no internal conflict,
monopoly is always superior to being an insider in duopoly.
When gains are lower and costs of investment higher, the stability arguments are again the
same as the situation where all managers invest in no-conflict (its three cases also appear here),
but there is an important diﬀerence. Here the monopoly does not invest. However, even if in
this region the monopoly does not invest, the reduction in competition and the lower benefits
from investment make the monopoly substantially more beneficial and makes it the only stable
industry structure (see region F1 and F2 of Figure 2). A merger to monopoly induces here
eﬃciency losses.
When costs are high with respect to gains, we are in Proposition 2(G) and 2(H). The
conflict eﬀect becomes always dominant and neither monopolists nor insiders invest. When the
17 In case (b), the investment Nash equilibrium in duopoly is not unique. There is an equilibrium where only
the insiders invest and a second where only the outsider invests. When two managers deviate, they are optimistic
and expect that in the duopoly structure the Nash equilibrium will be such that they will invest and the outsider
will not. They obtain more under this market structure than under triopoly and hence the triopoly is not stable.
When deviating from monopoly, the outsider being optimistic, assumes that the final equilibrium is the one in
which he invests. However, when the outsider invests, the insiders prefer to break up and to deviate towards
triopoly and we have no stability. For the same reason, the outsider-investing duopoly is not stable.
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investment is extremely expensive as compared to the cost-production savings, the optimal
decision for all managers will be not to invest.
Proposition 6 When there is internal conflict within firms and costs w.r.t. gains of investment
are high (only single-manager firms might invest).
(a) If only one triopolist invests, the triopoly or monopoly can be the unique stable industry
structure.
(b) Otherwise, only the monopoly can be a stable industry structure.
When only one triopolist invests and gains from investment are high enough, it is clear that
the triopoly will be the only stable industry structure.18 In the other cases, monopoly is stable
for the same reasons as in region D in Proposition 3.
When managers do not trust each other in a newly merged firm, they are less willing to
invest, making in turn a merger sometimes unprofitable. Thus, internal conflict generates less
mergers. This indicates that even when numerous factors would lead to monopolisation, man-
agers might decide not to merge because of a lack of trust. Mergers however still occur because of
the monopolisation factors. The monopolisation factors are twofold in our model: possible syn-
ergies and having more market power. But the lack of trust makes managers often not investing
and mergers lead in this case to eﬃciency losses.
6 Merger Regulation
The regulator should try and estimate whether the higher power enjoyed by mergers is likely or
not to be compensated by eﬃciency gains. We assume for most of this section that the regulator
maximises consumer welfare. This is consistent with the current standards used both in the US
and the EU to assess mergers.19 We adopt this assumption because it describes best current
practice and it has the advantage that it allows us to keep the analysis simple. Consumer welfare
18This triopolist does not want to merge with other managers because of the reinforcing conflict and strategic
eﬀects. The other two triopolists do not want to go together either. In a duopoly, the non-investing insiders are
in a disadvantage with respect to the investing outsider and moreover, they have to share profits.
19 In the US, the "substantial lessening of competition" test (SLC) has been interpreted that a merger is unlawful
if it is likely that it will lead to an increase in price (that is, to a decrease in consumer surplus). In the EU, it is
curently debated whether to switch to the SLC test or keep the current dominace test. It is less clear whether
this test is closer to a consumer welfare or total welfare standard, but the wording of article 1.1.(b) of the Merger
Regulation states that the Commission shall should take into account above all the interests of the consumers.
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in our model is defined as:
WC =
Q2
2
. (6)
The best solution for consumers is where total industry production is highest, inducing to a
lowest market price for consumers. Total production is increasing in the level of competition
and in firms’ eﬃciency.
First, suppose that we are in the scenario where managers are cooperating inside firms.
From the previous section we know that managers always want to merge towards monopoly. A
regulator needs thus to check when he wants to prohibit a monopoly.
Proposition 7 When there is no conflict in merged firms, a more concentrated market is wel-
fare improving for consumers only when (1) eﬃciencies are realized and, (2) these gains are
important enough.
Figure 5 presents the consumer optimum for internal cooperation.
[Place Figure 5 approximately here]
Whether potential eﬃciency gains will be realized is decisive for merger regulation. If a
regulator takes eﬃciency gains for granted because he assumes the investment cost c to be zero
-we call him a naive regulator - he may make significant mistakes. Whenever investment gains
are high enough, a naive regulator approves a merger towards monopoly (see bottom of Figure
5). However, we believe reality is more complex and investment costs should not be taken as
negligible, c > 0. From Proposition 1 we know that there are many combinations of costs w.r.t.
gains of investing where a merger does not lead to eﬃciency gains (see regions C and D of
Figure 1). Taking this into account makes relatively a lot more monopolies bad for consumers
since market power gains of firms are not going to be compensated with eﬃciency gains. For
costs w.r.t. gains reasonably high, a merger towards monopoly might be approved by a naive
regulator while it is not accompanied with eﬃciency gains and the merger should then not be
allowed.
Sometimes the opposite may also happen. Imagine the situation where investment costs are
zero, c = 0, and eﬃciency gains k are high enough such that managers in all firm structures would
invest, but these gains are not so high to have a monopoly or duopoly gain enough in eﬃciencies
to oﬀset gains in market power. A naive regulator says then no to any merger proposal. But
maybe investment costs c are such that triopolists do not want to invest. Then it can occur
that it is actually better to allow a merger towards monopoly since relative eﬃciency gains of
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the merger are high enough. Thus, sometimes a merger is erroneously blocked by naive merger
authorities. This type of mistake is intuitively less costly for consumers since there might be
some eﬃciency gains foregone, but firms gain not in market power. This leads us to the following
corollary:
Corollary 1 For managers cooperating internally, if antitrust authorities take eﬃciency gains
of mergers for granted, they may erroneously allow both too few or too many mergers from a
consumer welfare point of view.
What happens if managers do not cooperate inside the firm? Managers in larger firms may
invest less than if they would do in smaller firms as we explained in the previous section. Despite
investing less, managers will still mostly want to merge towards monopoly (see Figure 4).
Proposition 8 With internal conflict, a more concentrated market is welfare improving for
consumers only in exceptional cases: (1) when potential synergies are very high, and (2) when
these are realize despite internal conflict..
The results in Proposition 8 are summarized in Figure 6.
[Place Figure 6 approximately here]
As before, a naive regulator allows too many mergers when the potential eﬃciency gains are high
(see the bottom of Figure 6). But in this situation he makes this mistake more often because of
the internal conflict problem that becomes more serious for higher investment costs c. Moreover,
when managers do not cooperate internally, this mistake is more costly, since a merger might
lead to less eﬃcient firms as compared to the stand-alone firms as we discussed in the previous
section. The other mistake -prohibiting a merger that is welfare enhancing for consumers- is still
made, but less often than before; managers in larger firms invest less, making eﬃciency gains
seldom high enough to oﬀset higher market power. Thus:
Corollary 2 For managers not cooperating internally, if antitrust authorities take eﬃciency
gains of mergers for granted, they allow more often by mistake mergers as compared with the
situation where managers cooperate internally, but prohibit less often by mistake mergers.
Since allowing by mistake a merger is more costly than prohibiting one by mistake, as
explained above, a shortsighted regulator does more harm when there exists internal conflict.
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Let us now have a quick look at total welfare. If the regulator were to take also firm profits
into account, one could employ the standard sum of consumer and producer surplus,
WT =
Q2
2
+
X
w∈Ω
πw.
Figures 7 and 8 summarized the socially optimal market structure with no conflict and with it
when this measure of welfare is used.
[Place Figures 7 and 8 approximately here]
If the standard sum of consumer and producer surplus is used, then a naive regulator makes
considerably more mistakes than when using consumer welfare. If there is no internal conflict,
while the intended mergers towards monopoly should be now almost always accepted if eﬃciency
gains are taken for granted (see the bottom part of Figure 7), they should be forbidden for a
wide range of combinations of costs and gains. The reason is that firms gain relatively a lot
more when all invest -and a naive regulator allows then more often mergers- but this investment
very often does not materialise. The second type of mistakes -prohibiting a welfare enhancing
merger- is not made when using total welfare.
We can derive three main conclusions from the welfare analysis. First, taking eﬃciency gains
as exogenous would lead to the approval of many mergers that are welfare reducing. Second,
these approved mergers by mistake are made more often and are more costly when managers
do not cooperate internally. Third, when using total welfare as a welfare measure instead of
consumer welfare, mistakes are also made more often.
7 Merger Failures
Our model can also provide some explanation for the common phenomenon of merger failures.
Until now managers were assumed to know the exact situation within the firm. If managers
cannot perfectly foresee whether there will be internal conflict within the merged firm, it is
possible that wrong merger decisions are taken. Suppose that ex-ante managers merge because
they expect a priori that there will be no internal conflict, but conflict does arise later on. This
misjudgments might lead to a merger failure (less profits in merger than in no-merger). We have
indeed found cases where the monopoly is stable under no conflict (Section 5.1) but where in
a conflict situation, profits are higher with a lower market concentration (Section 5.2). Hence,
19
managers not foreseeing this conflict can erroneously merge.
A similar argument applies when managers are rational but there exists uncertainty about
the possibility of internal conflict. Let us assume that ex post -in the investment stage- we are
in one of our two extreme cases (no conflict at all or total conflict), but ex ante -in the merger
stage- managers cannot perfectly foresee what is going to happen. Thus, managers decide upon
merging given their expectations. Let us denote Pr(Conflict) = α, and Pr(NoConflict) = 1−α.
Once mergers have occurred, managers realise in which case they are and investment decisions
are as described in Section 4. We omit the derivation of the stable structures, but the procedure
is similar to the two cases presented before. The stable market structures are obtained by
calculating with expected profits and are defined by the investment gains (k), investment costs
(c) and expectations (α). For illustrating purposes, we depict in Figure 9 the stability results
for the case k = 1/2.
[Place Figure 9 approximately here]
When managers merge to monopoly because they expect the merger to be profitable (the
risk of internal conflict is suﬃciently low) but there arises a conflict later, there are cases where
triopoly or duopoly would have been better choices.20
It is worth noting that a complementary approach is to consider that uncertainty may aﬀect
the incentives to merge (see e.g. Banal-Estañol [2]). In addition, uncertainty over the ability of
the merging firms to achieve eﬃciency gains may aﬀect the behaviour of the outsiders. Amir
et al. [1] model the post-merger situation as a Cournot oligopoly wherein the outsiders face
uncertainty about the merged entity’s final cost. In an exogenous model they consider the
incentive for firms to merge and they show that bilateral mergers are profitable provided that
the non-merged firms believe that the merger will achieve large enough eﬃciency gains, even if
these gains do not materialise ex-post.
8 Endogenous sharing rules
Throughout the paper we considered the sharing rule as exogenous. In this section we want
to highlight that our results qualitatively remain unchanged in a model where the managers
optimally decide upon the sharing of the profits when the firm is formed.
20The opposite can also be true. If managers have a priori pessimistic expectations about the degree of internal
conflict and choose not to merge, it may well be ex post that a merger would have been profitable.
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It seems natural to assume that when managers are ex ante identical, all have to receive ex-
post the same payoﬀ when being in the same firm. This is indeed true when there is no conflict
because the sharing rule has no incentive eﬀects (or when there is conflict but the investment
cost is zero, c = 0). Each share is then determined by the managers’ bargaining power and, since
identical managers have the same bargaining power, they share profits equally.21 However, in a
situation of internal conflict where assets are hard-to-transfer, the form of the sharing scheme
-whether the managers receive their payoﬀ via a fixed fee and/or as a percentage of the joint
profit- determines the incentives to invest. Managers determine the terms of the contract in
order to maximise the firm’s profits while taking into account the incentives that this agreement
provides. We state the optimal contracts for monopoly.
Lemma 1 For given gains from investment, the optimal sharing scheme that managers in a
monopoly will agree on is:
(a) For very low costs of investment, the optimal sharing is the equal division of profits. Invest-
ment will reach a level 3k.
(b) For higher costs, one manager will receive a fixed fee and two managers will equally share
the monopoly profits (minus the fixed part for the first). Investment will be 2k.
(c) For still higher costs, a manager is the residual claimant of the firm, and the other two
managers will receive a fixed fee. Investment will be k.
(d) For very high costs of investment, any sharing scheme including the equal sharing of profits,
will be optimal. Investment is equal to zero.
Thus, when the parameter combinations are such that agreeing on an equal sharing of the
profits induces the same investment decision as in the non-conflict case, this sharing rule is
optimal. When the equal sharing does not give the right incentives in a multi-manager firm,
better investment incentives can be obtained by increasing the percentage of the profits to some
managers and compensate the others via a fixed fee. However, in this case the potential synergies
will be smaller since the managers receiving a fix payoﬀ will not invest.
The firm formed by two managers under duopoly has a similar payment scheme: for low
costs equal sharing of duopoly profits is optimal. For higher costs, a manager receives a fixed
fee and the other as residual claimant will be the only one to invest. For still higher costs no
manager will invest and equal sharing is again optimal.
21Ray &and Vohra [23] proved that in a sequential coalition formation game where players are identical and
they decide on the coalition they form and on nthe sharing rule, equal sharing is optimal.
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When managers set up the optimal payment scheme within firms, the diﬀerences between
the conflict and no conflict case change more gradually because in conflict the investment levels
decrease now more gradually. However, our results do not change qualitatively by letting multi-
manager firms sign optimal contracts. We have chosen to present the exogenous sharing rule case
because this reduces drastically the number of cases to consider. While having considerably more
cases, the analysis of the stable structures with endogenous sharing agreements is very similar
to Propositions 4, 5 and 6.
9 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to broaden the theory on horizontal mergers with eﬃciency gains
in concentrated markets, including investment as a strategic variable and allowing for a lack of
trust within the firm. This approach facilitates the understanding of why some mergers may fail
to become more eﬃcient or even fail to happen.
We construct an endogenous merger formation model with three managers simultaneously
taking merger decisions. Internal problems may arise on the moment where managers decide
on investing. The lack of trust and inability to identify individual contributions may result in
free-riding problems and suboptimal decisions.
We find indeed that even when a merger may be potentially more eﬃcient managers in a
merged firm do not necessarily want this to happen. People in a larger firm have eﬀectively more
incentives to invest because of synergies, but only do so when this is profitable. The problems
due to a lack of trust -becoming bigger in a larger firm- can even oﬀset the possible synergies
thereby making a merged firm less eﬃcient.
Welfare analysis tells us that taking eﬃciency gains as exogenous lead to the approval of too
many mergers that are welfare reducing. These approved mergers by mistake are made more
often and are more costly when managers do not cooperate internally. And, when using total
welfare as a welfare measure instead of consumer welfare, mistakes are also made more often. It
must be mentioned that sometimes a merger is mistakenly prohibited when taking into account
consumer welfare, but this mistake is intuitively less costly since firms maybe do not become
more eﬃcient, but gain neither in market power.
With our results, we want to point out that the recent documents on the “eﬃciency defence
of mergers” (see European Commission Report [6]) are forgetting some essential elements. A
regulator should not assume that possible eﬃciency gains of a merger will be realised, which
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could change the decision for approval of this merger. This calls for caution in allowing firms
to defend a merger on the base of eﬃciency gains. Especially in situations where information
about costs and gains of investing is diﬃcult to verify, it is maybe better to not let firms use this
argument. Finally, our model also gives an explanation for merger failures. When firms decide to
go together, the organisational diﬃculties that this creates are often underestimated. If managers
do not correctly foresee internal problems, they merge while this new entity is not profitable
and resulting thus in a failure.
Appendix
In this section we present the explicit expressions for the diﬀerent cases in the propositions
and their proofs. The proofs are given following a series of lemmas. We denote for simplicity
Πmj the (gross) profits for each manager in monopoly when j managers invest; Πij,l and Πol,j
the (gross) profits for each insider and outsider manager, respectively, when j insiders and l
outsiders invests; and Πt1,j and Π
t
0,j the (gross) profits for each triopolist when he invests and
when he does not, respectively, in the case the other j triopolists invest (j = 0, 1, 2). Similarly
we denote πm, πi, πoand πt the ‘net’ profits for each monopolist, insider, outsider and triopolist.
Proof of Proposition 1
Within each firm, it is always optimal for the managers to choose a corner solution, where
none of them invests or all of them do. Managers in a monopoly invest if and only if c ≤ cm
where cm is implicitly defined by Πm3 − cm = Πm0 . When there is competition, firms condition
their investment decisions to those of the rivals. In a duopoly, insiders’ decision depends on the
decision of the outsider and vice versa. The insiders invest if c ≤ ci1 and if c ≤ ci0 depending,
respectively, whether the outsider invest or not, where Πi2,1 − ci1 = Πi0,1 and Πi2,0 − ci0 = Πi0,0.
Similarly, the outsider invest if c ≤ co2 and if c ≤ co0 depending, respectively, whether the insiders
invest or not, where Πo1,2 − co2 = Πo0,2 and Πi1,0 − co0 = Πo0,0. Finally, each triopolist invests if
c ≤ ctj , where Πt1,j − ctj = Πt0,j .
Lemma 2 The relevant cutoﬀs are ordered as follows: ct2 < ct1 < ct0 < ci; co < ci; ct0 < cm and
co < cm where for simplicity we denote ci ≡ ci0 and co ≡ co2.
Proof. By definition, the cutoﬀ points for the triopolists are ct2 =
3k(2−k)
16 , ct1 =
3k(2+k)
16 and
ct0 =
3k(2+3k)
16 . In a duopoly, ci1 =
4k(1+k)
9 , ci0 =
4k(1+2k)
9 , co2 =
4k(1−k)
9 and co0 =
4k(1+k)
9 . Notice
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that co0 is not relevant. In the region where the outsider does invest only if the insiders do not
(co2 < c < co0), the latter always invest (ci0 > ci1 = co0). Similarly, ci1 is not relevant because when
the insiders would stop investing if the outsider invested, the latter never invests. Finally, in a
monopoly, cm = k(2+3k)4 . The ordering follows from straightforward algebra.
The following Lemma characterizes the four diﬀerent regions in Proposition 1.
Lemma 3 The investment decision levels are the following.
a) If c ≤ min{co, ct2} all managers in all firms invest.
b) If min{co, ct2} < c ≤ min{ci, cm}, managers in the monopoly and insiders in a duopoly
invest but single-manager firms may not.
c) If min{ci, cm} < c ≤ max{ci, cm}, either the insiders or the monopolists invest while the
rest never does. If k ≤ 25 we have that ci ≤ cm and only the monopolists invest whereas if k >
2
5
we have that ci > cm and only the insiders invest.
d) If c > max{ci, cm}, no manager invests.
Proof. a) and d) From Lemma 2, if c ≤ min{co, ct2} all the cutoﬀs are above and hence all firms
invest whereas if c > max{ci, cm} all the cutoﬀs are below and hence no manager invests.
b) In this region, by definition, the insiders and the monopolists invest. Within the region,
as c increases the single-manager firms stop investing gradually (in diﬀerent order depending on
k).
c) From Lemma 2 the cutoﬀs for all single-manager firms are below and hence they never
invest. Straightforward algebra shows that when k ≤ 25 we have that ci ≤ cm and therefore only
the monopolists invest whereas when k > 25 then ci > cmand only the insiders invest.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2
Each manager in a monopoly invests as long as c ≤ ecmj when j other managers invest (j = 0, 1, 2),
where Πmj+1 − ecmj = Πmj . When the outsider invests in the duopoly, each insider invests if
c ≤ ecij,1 depending whether the other insider invests or not (j = 0, 1) where Πij+1,1− ecij,1 = Πij,1.
Similarly, when the outsider does not invest, the cutoﬀ points are ecij,0 (j = 0, 1) with the
analogous definitions. The cutoﬀ values for the single-manager firms are the same as in the
proof of Proposition 1, ecoj = coj and ectj = ctj .
Lemma 4 The relevant cutoﬀs are ordered as follows: ect2 < ect1 < ect0 < eco0; ecm < ect1; ecm < eci1 <eci0 < ect0; eco2 < eco0 and eci1 < ect1 where for simplicity we denote ecm ≡ ecm2 and ecij ≡ eci1,j.
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Proof. In the monopoly structure, ecm0 = k(2+k)12 , ecm1 = k(2+3k)12 and ecm2 = k(2+5k)12 . We have that
all the managers investing is an equilibrium whenever c ≤ ecm2 whereas no manager investing is
an equilibrium whenever c > ecm0 . Between ecm0 and ecm2 both equilibrium coexist but the former
is chosen because it Pareto dominates the latter. Then ecm0 and ecm1 are not relevant. In the
duopoly structure, the cutoﬀs for the insiders are eci0,0 = 2k(1+k)9 , eci0,1 = 2k9 , eci1,0 = 2k(1+3k)9 andeci1,1 = 2k(1+2k)9 . The same argument as in the monopoly case applies here and only the cutoﬀs
in which the partner invests are relevant. In turn, the relevant cutoﬀs for the outsiders are the
ones in which none or all the insiders invest. The cutoﬀs for the outsider and the triopolists are
obtained in the proof of the previous proposition. Straightforward algebra leads to the ordering.
Lemma 5 The investment decision levels are the following.
a) If c ≤ ecm the managers in the monopoly and the insiders in the duopoly invest.
b) If ecm < c ≤ eci1 or max{eci1,eco2} < c ≤ eci0 there is an equilibrium in which the insiders in
the duopoly invest whereas the managers in the monopoly never invest.
c) If eci1 < c ≤ min{eco2,eci0} and eci0 < c ≤ eco0 the insiders and the monopolists never invest and
at least one single-manager firm invests.
d) If c > eco0 nobody invests.
Proof. a) We can distinguish two subcases: a.1) When c ≤ min{ecm,eco2}, from Lemma 4, all the
managers invest because all the cutoﬀs are above. a.2) When eco2 ≤ c < ecm the outsider does not
invest by definition and there may be a triopolist that does not invest (when ect2 ≤ c < ecm). In
other situations, all managers invest.
b) Here the monopolists stop investing. Again we can distinguish two subcases: b.1) whenecm < c ≤ eci1 the insiders always invest independent of the outsider decision. From Lemma
4, depending on the combination of parameters, the outsider may or may not invest whereas
there are two or three triopolists doing so. b.2) If max{eci1,eco2} < c ≤ eci0 there are two possible
equilibria in the duopoly: either the insiders do invest and the outsider does not or vice versa.
Again from Lemma 4 we can check that there might be one or two triopolists investing.
c) Here the insiders and the monopolists never invest. We distinguish five subcases: c.1)
when eci1 < c ≤ ect2 the three triopolists and the outsider invest, c.2) when max{ect2,eci1} < c ≤
min{eco2,ect1} or when max{eco2,eci0} < c ≤ ect1 two triopolist and the outsider invest, c.3) when
max{ect1,eci0} < c ≤ ect0 one triopolist and the outsider invests, c.4) when ect0 < c ≤ eco0 only the
outsider invest and c.5) when c > eco0 no one invests.
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This completes the proof of Proposition 2. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3
In the following Lemma, we show that in our game we cannot have multiple stable regions when
there is no conflict .
Lemma 6 For any combination of parameters, there is at most one stable structure.
Proof. Remember that we denote πm, πi and πo the ‘net’ profits for each monopolist, insider
and outsider (the equilibria in investment are unique). In order to consider all the possible cases
in the triopoly, denote πta ≥ πtb ≥ πtc the net profits obtained by each triopolist. In what follows
we state the conditions needed to ensure stability. The monopoly is stable when: (1) πm ≥ πi
and (2) if πtb ≤ πi then πm ≥ πo whereas if πtb > πi then πm ≥ πta (remember that the deviator
is always ”optimistic”). The duopoly is stable when (3) πi > πm or πo > πm and (4) if πtb ≤ πi
then πi ≥ πo whereas if πtb > πi then πi ≥ πta. The second part of condition (4) is never satisfied
(πta ≥ πtb) and hence condition (4) can be rewritten as (4’) both πtb ≤ πi and πi ≥ πo should
hold. Finally, the triopoly is stable whenever (5) πta > πm and (6) πtb > πi.
We are going to show the result by contradiction. Suppose firstly that the monopoly and
the duopoly are stable at the same time. From (1) and (3), we get that πo > πm and from (2)
and (4’) that πm ≥ πo and hence a contradiction. Secondly, the duopoly and the triopoly can
not be simultaneously stable structures because (4’) and (6) can not be satisfied at the same
time. Finally, suppose that the monopoly and the triopoly are stable structures. From (2) and
(6) we obtain that πm ≥ πta which is in contradiction with (5).
Thanks to the following lemma, we know that the triopoly will never be a stable structure.
Lemma 7 Managers always prefer the monopoly to the triopoly.
Proof. Suppose firstly that the monopolists do not invest. By Lemma 2 none of the triopolists
invests either. Since Πm0 =
1
12 >
1
16 = Π
t
0,0 the monopoly is always preferred. Next suppose
that a given manager invests both in monopoly and in triopoly. Again, the monopoly is always
preferred since Πm3 =
(1+3k)2
12 >
(1+3k)2
16 = Π
t
1,0 > Πt1,1 > Πt1,2. Last, take the case in which a
manager would invest as a monopolist but not as a triopolist. He would prefer a monopoly to
a triopoly in which none of the other triopolists invests when Πm3 − c > Πt0,0 or in other words
when c < 1+24k+36k248 . This is always the case in this region since c < cm <
1+24k+36k2
48 . When
there are one or two other triopolists investing, the monopoly is even more preferred.
26
Lemma 8 Managers prefer the monopoly than being insiders in a duopoly.
Proof. First suppose that a given manager invests both in the monopoly and being insider
in a duopoly. Since Πm3 =
(1+3k)2
12 >
(1+4k)2
18 = Π
i
2,0 > Πi2,1, the insiders would never deviate
from a monopoly. Second, he always prefers the monopoly whenever he does not invest in either
situation because Πm0 =
1
12 >
1
18 = Π
i
0,0 > Πi0,1. Third, take the case in which he would invest
in the monopoly but not in the duopoly (from Lemma 2 the outsider does not invest in this
region either). The monopoly is preferred whenever Πm3 − c > Πi0,0 or in other words when
c < 1+18k+27k236 . This is always the case here since c < cm <
1+18k+27k2
36 . Finally suppose that
as an insider he would invest but not as a monopolist (again the outsider does not invest). He
prefers the monopoly as long as Πm0 > Πi2,0− c or c > −1+16k+32k
2
36 . Since c > cm >
−1+16k+32k2
36
this is always the case in this region.
Lemma 9 The monopoly is the unique stable structure when being in a monopoly is better than
being an outsider (πm ≥ πo) or when insiders in a duopoly would break for triopoly (πtb > πi) .
Otherwise, no industry structure is stable.
Proof. Each one of these conditions, together with Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, ensure that
conditions (1) and (2) in the proof of Lemma 6 are satisfied and hence the monopoly is the
(unique) stable structure. We show the second statement by contradiction. Suppose firstly that
these conditions are not satisfied and that the duopoly is stable. From Lemma 6 the duopoly
could only be stable when the monopoly is not or in other words when πtb ≤ πi and πo > πm.
From Lemma 8 we have that πm > πi and hence πi ≥ πo. This contradicts the condition (4’) in
the proof of Lemma 6. Secondly, from Lemma 7 the triopoly is never stable.
Lemma 10 When there is no internal conflict within firms, the monopoly is the only stable
structure. No stable structure exists when (c, k) are such that k1 ≤ k < k2 and c ≤ ct2, where
k1 = 4
√
2−5
21 and k2 =
2
√
3−3
3 .
Proof. We are going to prove this lemma following the four parts identified in Lemma 3:
a) We have that πt = Πt1,2 − c > Πi2,1 − c = πi whenever k < k1 = 4
√
2−5
21 and that
πm = Πm3 − c ≥ Πo1,2− c = πo whenever k ≥ k2 = 2
√
3−3
9 . From Lemma 9 the monopoly is stable
if k < k1 or k ≥ k2 whereas if k1 ≤ k < k2 no industry structure is stable.
b) We are going to show that at least one of the two conditions in Lemma 9 is satisfied. On
the one hand we show that when k ≥ 115 we have that πm ≥ πo. If the outsider does invest,
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πm = Πm3 − c ≥ Πo1,2 − c = πo when k ≥ k2 and in particular when k ≥ 115 . If the outsider does
not invest, πm = Πm3 − c ≥ Πo0,2 = πo when c ≤ −1+34k+11k
2
36 . This inequality is always satisfied
when k ≥ 115 and c < ci.
On the other hand we show that when k < 115 we have that πtb > πi. Take first the case
in which no triopolist invests (c > ct0). We have that πt = Πt0,0 > Πi2,0 − c (and in particular
that πt > Πi2,1 − c) whenever c > −1+64k+128k
2
144 . This is always satisfied when k <
1
15 and
c > ct0. Second consider the case where only one triopolist invests. From the definition of
the cutoﬀs (see proof of Lemma 2), the outsider always invests in this region when we impose
k < 115 . In addition, we have that πtb = Πt0,1. We have that πtb = Πt0,1 > Πi2,1 − c = πi whenever
c > −1+66k+63k2144 . This is always satisfied when k <
1
15 and c > ct1. Last take the case in
which two triopolists invest (again here the outsider would invest). In this case πtb = Πt1,1 and
πtb = Πt1,1 − c > Πi2,1 − c = πi whenever k <
√
2−1
6 and in particular when k <
1
15 .
c) In the part of this region where only the monopolists invest we have that πt = Πt0,0 >
Πi0,0 = πi and hence the monopoly is the stable structure. When the insiders invest, we have
that πt = Πt0,0 > Πi2,0 − c = πi whenever c > −1+64k+128k
2
144 . This condition is always satisfied
since c > cm ≥ −1+64k+128k2144 .
d) Similar to the first part of part c), the monopoly is stable since πt = Πt0,0 > Πi0,0 = πi.
This completes the proof of Proposition 3. QED
Proof of Proposition 4
In this and in the following proofs we are going to use, when possible, Lemma 6. In fact, it
applies as long as there is not multiplicity of equilibria in the duopoly investment decisions. As
we have seen in the proof of Lemma 5 the region (a) can be divided in two parts.
a.1) When any manager in any situation invests, the stable structures and the proofs are
identical to those of Proposition 3 when everyone was investing.
a.2) The monopoly is stable because it is preferred to any other position in any other industry
structure. We have that πm = Πm3 −c > Πi2,0−c = πi and that πm > Πt1,1−c > Πt1,2−c and hence
managers prefer the monopoly to being insiders and being triopolists investing (independent of
being two or three of them doing so). They prefer the monopoly to being outsiders when
πm ≥ Πo0,2 = πo or when c ≤ −1+34k+11k
2
36 and the monopoly to being triopolists not investing
when πm ≥ Πt0,2 or when c ≤ 1+36k+24k
2
48 . These two conditions are always satisfied in this region
( eco2 ≤ c < ecm). Thus, the monopoly is stable and from Lemma 6 it is unique.
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Proof of Proposition 5
As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 5 this region can be divided in two parts.
b.1) Here the uniqueness result still applies. Managers prefer being insiders than monopolists
whenever c ≤ c1(k) = −1+12k+18k
2
36 : when the outsider invests πi = Πi2,1 − c > Πm0 = πm
precisely when c ≤ c1(k) whereas when he does not we have that πi = Πi2,0 − c > Πm0 = πm
is always satisfied in this region. In addition, πi ≥ πtb independent of the number of triopolists
investing and of the choice of the outsider. They also prefer to be an insider than an outsider,
πi ≥ πo, independent of the outsider investment decision. This three conditions are necessary
and suﬃcient to ensure duopoly stability (see proof of Lemma 6).
When c > c1(k), we have that managers in a monopoly do not invest whereas in any other
situation all managers invest (see proof of Lemma 5). Managers prefer the monopoly to being
insiders by definition. They also prefer the monopoly to the triopoly πm = Πm0 > Πt1,2 −
c = πt and hence the triopoly is never stable. Choices between monopoly and outsider and
between insider and triopoly are going to determine three diﬀerent regions. Managers prefer
being monopolists than outsiders whenever c ≥ c2 = 136 and they prefer being insiders to
triopolists whenever k ≥ k1 (see proof of Proposition 3). This defines three regions because: (a)
c01(k) > 0 and the k∗ such that c1(k∗) = eci1(k∗) is larger than the k∗∗ such that c2 = eci1(k∗∗)
and (b) the k∗∗∗ such that c2 = eci0(k∗∗∗) is larger than k1. In the first region, when k ≤ k1,
the monopoly is stable because condition (1) and the second part of (2) are satisfied. In the
second region, when k ≥ k1 and c < c2 no structure is stable. The monopoly is not stable
because condition (2) is not satisfied and the duopoly is not stable because managers prefer
being outsiders than insiders (πo > πm ≥ πi) breaking condition (4’). Finally, when c ≥ c2 (and
c > c1(k)) the monopoly is stable because condition (1) and the first part of (2) are satisfied.
b.2) There are two diﬀerent equilibria in the duopoly (Lemma 5): either the two insiders
or the outsider invest. The profits in the investing equilibrium are always higher than in the
non-investing one for both the insiders and the outsider (Πi2,0 − c ≥ Πi0,1 and Πo1,0 − c ≥ Πo0,2).
Denoting the net profits in the insiders-investing equilibrium as πid and πod and in the outsider-
investing one as πie and πoe, we have that πid > πie and πod < πoe.
We restate the stability conditions in order to accommodate this multiplicity. The monopoly
is stable when: (M1) πm ≥ πid and (M2) if πtb ≤ πie then πm ≥ πoe whereas if πtb > πie then
πm ≥ πta. The insiders-investing duopoly is stable when (M3) πid > πm or πod > πm and (M4)
if πtb ≤ πie then πid ≥ πoe whereas if πtb > πie then πid ≥ πta. The outsiders-investing duopoly is
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stable when (M5) πie > πm or πoe > πm and (M6) if πtb ≤ πie then πie ≥ πoe whereas if πtb > πie then
πie ≥ πta. The second part of condition (M6) is never satisfied (πta ≥ πtb) and hence condition
(M6) can be rewritten as (M6’) both πtb ≤ πie and πie ≥ πoe should hold. Finally, the triopoly is
stable whenever (M7) πta > πm and (M8) πtb > πid.
Now we are going to show that the insiders-investing duopoly is stable. Firstly πid = Πi2,0−c >
Πm0 = πm whenever c ≤ −1+16k+32k
2
36 which is always true in this region. Hence condition (M3)
is satisfied. We also have that πtb > πie independent of having one or two triopolists investing.
If there is one clearly πtb = Πt0,1 > Πi0,1 = πie whereas if there are two πtb = Πt1,1 − c > Πi0,1 = πie
whenever c ≤ 1+52k+28k2144 which is always true when c < ect1. Finally, the condition πid > πta is
also satisfied since πid = Πi2,0− c > Πt1,0− c > Πt1,1− c in this region (as a triopolist, it is always
better to be investing). The second part of condition (M4) is satisfied and hence this structure
is stable.
This is the unique stable structure. The monopoly is not stable because, as we have seen,
πid > πm in contradiction with (M1). The outsider-duopoly is not stable either because πtb > πie
and hence condition (M6’) does not hold. Finally, the triopoly is not stable because πid > πta ≥ πtb
contradicts condition (M8).
Proof of Proposition 6
As we have seen in the proof of Lemma 5 this region (c) can be divided in five parts. Here
the uniqueness result applies. Managers clearly prefer to be monopolists rather than insiders
(πm = Πm0 > Πi0,0 > Πi0,1). We also have that πtb > πi everywhere except when there are three
triopolists investing (case c.1) where this is true only when c < c3(k) = 1+34k+k
2
144 . Indeed, when
there are three triopolists investing this is the condition such that πtb = Πt1,2 − c > Πi0,1 = πi.
When there are two investing we have that πtb = Πt1,1 − c > Πi0,1 = πi whenever c < 1+52k+28k
2
144
which is always the case when c < ect1. Clearly, when there is only one πtb = Πt0,1 > Πi0,1 = πi
(the outsider always invests) and where there is none πtb = Πt0,0 > Πi0,0 > Πi0,1.
On the other hand, we have that πm ≥ πta in all cases except when there is only one triopolist
investing where this is true only when c > c4(k) = −1+18k+27k
2
48 . Indeed, when there is only one
triopolist investing this is the condition such that πm = Πm0 ≥ Πt1,0 − c = πta (we can check
that the it is better to be the one investing). When there are two investing we have that
πm = Πm0 ≥ Πt1,1− c = πta whenever c > −1+12k+12k
2
48 and this is satisfied when c > eci1. Therefore
they also prefer the monopoly to being triopolist when the three invest. When none of the
triopolists invests, clearly πm = Πm0,0 > Πt0,0 = πt.
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Hence in all region c) except when there are three triopolists investing and c ≥ c3(k) or when
there is one triopolist investing and c ≤ c4(k), the monopoly is the unique stable structure.
Conditions (1) and (2) in the proof of Lemma 6 are satisfied.
When there is one triopolist investing and c ≤ c4(k) the triopoly is the unique stable struc-
ture. In this region we have seen that πta > πm and, as before, πtb > πi satisfying conditions (5)
and (6).
Finally, when there are three triopolists investing and c ≥ c3(k) there is no stable structure.
We have that πo = Πo1,0−c > Πm0 = πm when c < 1+10k+7k
2
18 and πo = Πo1,0−c > Πi0,1 = πi when
c < 1+16k+16k236 . These two conditions hold when c < ect2. Then, since πtb ≤ πi, the monopoly is
not stable because it would contradict condition (2). The duopoly is not stable either because
πo > πi contradicts condition (4’). Lastly, the triopoly is not stable because we have showed
that πm ≥ πta, which is in contradiction with condition (5).
Proof of Proposition 7
From (6), we have that consumer welfare is maximized when total production is highest. From
(2), total production is given by
QΩ =
P
w∈Ω
Ã
1−
P
υ∈Ω,υ 6=ω
Iυ + rIω
!
r + 1 where Ω = {ΩM ,ΩD,ΩT}
We are going to prove this lemma following the four parts identified in Lemma 3.
In region a) all managers would invest (Ij = k for any j). Hence, QΩM = 1+3k2 , QΩD =
2+3k
3
and QΩT = 3(1+k)4 . Clearly since QΩT > QΩD for k <
1
3 , QΩT > QΩM for k <
1
3 and QΩD > QΩM
for k < 13 , we have that the optimal industry structure is triopoly when k <
1
3 and the monopoly
when k ≥ 13 .
In the first part of region c) (i.e. when k < 25) only the monopolists would invest (Im = k
and Ij = 0 for j 6= m). Hence, we have that QΩM = 1+3k2 , QΩD = 23 and QΩT = 34 , and therefore
the optimal structure is the triopoly for k < 16 and the monopoly for k ≥
1
6 .In the second part
of region c) (i.e. when k ≥ 25) only the insiders in the duopoly would invest (Ii = k and Ij = 0
for j 6= i). Hence, we have that QΩM = 12 , QΩD = 2+2k3 and QΩT = 34 , and therefore the optimal
structure is the duopoly.
In region d) no manager invests (Ij = 0 for any j). Hence, since QΩM = 12 , QΩD =
2
3 and
QΩT = 34 , the triopoly is the optimal industry structure.
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In region b) the monopolists and the insiders in the duopoly invest but the single firms
may not (Ij = k for j = m and j = i). We should distinguish seven diﬀerent cases depending
on whether the triopolists and the outsider invest. If the outsider invests, following the same
process, we have that the monopoly is the optimal industry structure when k ≥ 13 ; the duopoly
is optimal when k < 13 and when k ≥
1
6 , k ≥
1
9 or k ≥
1
12 when two, one or no triopolist invest,
respectively; and the triopoly is optimal otherwise.
Suppose now that the outsider does not invest. If no triopolist invests, the optimal industry
structure is the monopoly when k ≥ 15 , the duopoly when
1
16 < k ≤
1
5 and the triopoly when
k < 116 or k ≥
1
12 when two, one or no triopolist invest, respectively; and the triopoly is optimal
otherwise. If one (resp. two, three) triopolist invests, the optimal industry structure is the
monopoly when k ≥ 15 (resp., k ≥
1
4 and k ≥
1
3) and the triopoly when k <
1
5 (resp., k <
1
4 and
k < 13). The results are plotted in Figure 5.
Proof of Proposition 8
Following the same procedure as in the previous proof, we can obtain the results plotted in
Figure 6.
Proof of Lemma 1
Let us denote the contract of manager i by the fixed fee (that we will denote Fi) and the share on
the profits (denoted i). Managers will determine the terms of the contract maximise the firm’s
profits taking into account the incentives that this agreement provides. The payoﬀ of manager i
in monopoly is Fi+ i[πm(Im = mk)] for all i, where Fi is the fixed fee, i the share of the gross
monopoly profits πm having m managers in the firm investing k, making total investment in the
firm Im = mk. Since investment is not contractible, each manager privately bears the cost c if
he invests. A manager’s incentives to invest also depend on the other managers’ behavior. For
the equal sharing rule:
* If two managers invest, the third one will do so iﬀ (1+3k)
2
4 − 3ck >
(1+2k)2
4 ⇐⇒ c <
1
6 +
5
12k.
* In one manager invests and the other does not, the third manager invests iﬀ (1+2k)
2
4 − 3ck >
(1+k)2
4 ⇐⇒ c <
1
6 +
1
4k.
* In none of the other two managers invest, the third one does it iﬀ (1+k)
2
4 − 3ck >
1
4 ⇐⇒
c < 16 +
1
12k.
Proceeding in the same way for the other possible sharing rules, and checking the total profits
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that the monopoly will get for them, we conclude that:
* For c ∈
£
0, 16 +
5
12k
¢
, rewarding all managers a percentage of the profits (Fi = 0 and i = 13)
yields the best incentives.
* For c ∈
£
1
6 +
5
12k,
1
4 +
3
8k
¢
, the optimal contracts are:
F1 =
1
3
[πm(Im = 2k)− 2c] and 1 = 0,
F2 = F3 = −
1
6
[πm(Im = 2k)− 2c] and 2 = 3 =
1
2
.
* For c ∈
£
1
4 +
3
8k,
1
2 +
1
4k
¢
the optimal contracts are:
F1 = F2 =
1
3
[πm(Im = 2k)− c] 1 = 2 = 0,
F3 = −
2
3
[πm(Im = 2k)− 2c] 3 = 1.
* For c ∈
£
1
2 +
1
4k,∞
¢
no manager will invest. Then Fi = 0 and i = 13 for i = 1, 2, 3 is optimal
(any other sharing contract will provide to the same incentives).
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